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“Quite possibly there's nothing as fine as a big freight train starting across country in
early summer... That's when you learn that the tragedy of plants is that they have roots.”
–
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Mark Helprin, Winter’s Tale (1983)
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Abstract
This study presents multiple approaches to examine the liberalization of rail transport in
the European Union. A legislative review highlights the importance of unbundling
infrastructure management and service operations in railway reforms. Furthermore,
simultaneous and sequential decision making models specify how market opening
minimizes the social deadweight loss and lead to more competitive pricing. Two
production frontier models also analyze the effects of vertical disintegration and market
opening on network outputs. Results suggest that both vertical unbundling and increasing
competitiveness help improve productivity. Lastly, three case studies compare policy
implementations across Europe. The United Kingdom, a front runner in railway
liberalization, has used franchising to split up British Rail extensively. Germany’s
integrated model, which keeps the infrastructure manager and the service operator under
one umbrella company, has also reached the advanced level. Still, the incumbent
Deutsche Bahn has maintained its dominance in long-distance routes. Meanwhile in
France, reluctance to replace public ownership in railway companies poses a substantial
obstacle for market opening reforms.
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Part I: Introduction
In the 1980s, as railway companies lost ridership and became increasingly dependent on
public funding, governments across Europe were under pressure to reform the heavily
subsidized national railway networks (Andersson & Hultén, 2009; Szekely, 2009). Rail
transport liberalization first took place in Sweden in 1988, when the Transport Policy Act
was adopted. Following this legislation, the Swedish government formed Banvekert, the
national infrastructure manager, while the incumbent monopoly SJ AB became a service
operator, paying infrastructure usage fees to Banvekert (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2008).
Moreover, local transport authorities took over SJ AB’s ownership of regional routes and
were able to offer competitive tendering in these routes. This reform resulted in the first
market entrance in 1990, a lower level of public subsidies and a price reduction in the
operations of regional lines (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2008; International Labor
Organization, 1991). The successful vertical separation between infrastructure
management and service operations in Sweden and progresses in increasing competition
in several other member states provided the regulatory framework for a EU-wide reform
that was aimed to liberalize national railway networks in Europe as they became more
integrated (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2008).
Since its initiation in Directive 91/440, the liberalization process of rail transport has been
central to European Union competition policy. The European Commission (2008) argued
that opening up rail transport market and privatizing existing monopolies helped promote
rail networks’ efficiency and responsiveness to customers’ demand. Alexandersson and
Hultén (2008), however, highlighted that privatizing public monopolies like railways was
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mainly aimed to gain revenues for the public sector or to reduce public subsidies in the
future. Like in Sweden’s 1988 reform, the foremost step of EU railway liberalization
involved vertical separation between infrastructure management and service operations.
Implementing Directive 91/440, the European Commission emphasized establishing
distinct organization entities to differentiate rail transport operators and infrastructure
managers, and required separate accounting systems between these two network levels.
Lawmakers considered this separation a vital boost for market competition by providing
equal rail capacity allocation, fair infrastructure charging and easy licensing for new rail
operators (European Commission, 2008). Directive 91/440 was later followed by three
main reform packages and several legislations to deregulate rail markets in multiple
aspects. A regulatory review in the next chapter will analyze EU rail liberalization
reforms in detail.
My thesis will furthermore provide a theoretical framework to examine rail transport
liberalization. Analyses based on antitrust economics and game theory principles were
developed to answer several questions such as: Why is a monopolistic market inefficient?
How do new entrants improve market conditions? How are market outcomes affected
after the market opening? How do the players determine their prices and market shares?
An econometric analysis of railway reforms will also be featured as my thesis’s second
main focus. Using a production frontier model based on the Cobb-Douglas production
function, two regression tests will examine European rail networks’ productivity under
the impact of increasing market competitiveness and unbundling infrastructure
management and service operations. The two tests cover different time frames and
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geographical span and are expected to provide alternating perspectives of rail
liberalization outcomes.
The reality of rail reform implementation also varies widely between networks across
Europe. The operational structures range from complete separation in the United
Kingdom, partial separation in Germany and less separation in France. The outcomes of
deregulation are also significantly different between EU member states. The last chapter
of this thesis, thus, will compare the reality of railway liberalization in different national
networks.
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Part II: Legislative Review
In a 2004 study on competition policy in the European Union, Knieps introduced a
disaggregated analysis of network sectors to locate the appropriate focus of antitrust
regulation. Knieps’ findings highlighted that network sectors such as electricity, water
supply, air transport and rail transport contained three fundamental levels: network
infrastructure, infrastructure management and network services. In rail transport, the base
level corresponds to the construction of tracks and other fixed infrastructure, while the
intermediate level deals with traffic and infrastructure administration and the top level is
rail service operations. The three layers in network sectors can be summarized as follows:

•

Base level: Network infrastructure = construction of tracks and other fixed
infrastructure

•

Intermediate level: Infrastructure management = railway traffic control and track
management

•

Top level: Network services = rail transport services

In a monopolistic national railway network, all of the three levels are usually controlled
by one large-scale corporation that builds tracks and stations, controls rail traffic and runs
train services. It should also be noted that entry to the fixed infrastructure level can incur
an enormous sunk cost for building tracks, which makes it highly difficult, or even
impossible to boost competition. This barrier to entry at the base level is usually referred
to as a monopolistic bottleneck: the track owner is the sole upstream supplier of
infrastructure access to train service operators. When the track owner also runs train
services, they would obviously give prioritized infrastructure access to their own
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operations. As a result, unbundling this vertical tie between track management and train
services is a vital move to increase market competition in network sectors.
The EU Directive 91/440 was the European Union Council’s foremost step in its ongoing
process of liberalizing the member states’ railway markets. This legislation focused on
breaking down rail networks’ vertical integration by establishing distinct organization
entities for train service operations and infrastructure management. With this approach,
antitrust lawmakers aimed at boosting market competition by ensuring that “essential
functions such as allocation of rail capacity (the ‘train paths’ that companies need to be
able to operate trains on the network), infrastructure charging and licensing must be
separated from the operation of transport services and performed in a neutral fashion to
give new rail operators fair access to the market” (European Commission, 2008, p. 8).
After most member states unbundled their track managers and service operators at the
accounting level, the railway liberalization process continued with two next key
regulations in 1995 that focused on licensing and infrastructure allocation. Directive
95/18/EC specified a universal licensing process for new railway undertakings; thanks to
this crucial legislative move, a train service operator who successfully obtained a license
from one EU member state could freely compete in all other EU markets. On the other
hand, Directive 95/19/EC provided the framework for fair allocation and infrastructure
capacity charging for railway undertakings. Based on the focus of these two legislations,
it could be seen that the initial Directive 91/440, which separated the vertical integration
between infrastructure management and service operations, would become largely
ineffective without these subsequent reforms.
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Coming into effect in 2001, the First Railway Package provided improvement and
development from the initial legislations in 1991 and 1995. First of all, Directive
2001/12/EC extended the original Directive 91/440 that focused on breaking down the
vertical tie by establishing clearer requirements for the relationship between the state and
the infrastructure manager, and between the infrastructure manager and service operators.
Besides, Directive 2001/13/EC introduced additional licensing requirements introduced
in Directive 95/18/EC by bringing in more safety and service quality criteria. Directive
2001/14/EC furthermore focused on advancing the framework for non-discriminatory
allocation and charging of infrastructure in Directive 95/19/EC: it required infrastructure
access fees to be set and collected by an independent entity and thus eliminated the
potential to manipulate the monopolistic power of infrastructure managers (European
Commission, 2010). In addition, according to this European Commission comprehensive
study, the First Railway Package also boosted Trans-European rail transport by
minimizing delays at borders and setting up a relevant inter-network tariff structure.
The Second Railway Package adopted in 2004 was the European Union Council’s next
step to liberalize the national and international rail transport networks with a focus on
upgrading

safety

and

interoperability.

Directive

2004/49/EC

targeted

greater

harmonization of safety requirements for new railway undertakings across member states,
which in turn, provided European railway companies with greater opportunities to
operate internationally, as well as to enter new markets. Interoperability was further
enhanced in Directive 2004/50/EC, which developed common requirements for
international high speed train services. Moreover, Regulation (EC) 881/2004 founded the
European Railway Agency to administrate the common safety principles and boost EU-
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wide integration of member states’ rail networks. On the other hand, Directive
2004/51/EC also opened up the domestic and international cargo markets – an essential
step that brought the liberalization process to the next level with a free freight transport
market.
In 2007, the European Commission implemented the Third Railway Package that further
improved the liberalization process established in the previous legislative approaches.
Directive 2007/58/EC allowed free access to the international market of passenger
transport, which could be seen as another vital boost in the opening of railway markets.
Furthermore, passengers’ basic rights were ensured and enhanced at a EU-wide level in
Regulation (EC) 1371/2007. Besides, the Third Railway Package also helped increase the
interoperability of the Trans-European railway network by developing common licensing
for train drivers: license holders could now move much more easily among different EU
member states’ national networks.
As of January 2013, the European Commission had finished constructing the draft for the
Fourth Railway Package (Barrow, 2013); AK Europa reported in March 2013 that the
European Parliament was currently debating to improve the proposals. The package
would finally open up domestic passenger transport networks, which provided external
service operators with full access to infrastructure in all national and regional markets
(Barrow, 2013). Liberalizing domestic passenger transport could be considered as one of
the final major steps that would maximize the degree of market opening in EU railway
legislation. Following this legislation, both domestic and international networks of freight
and passenger transport would be fully opened for competition. The International
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Railway Journal also suggested transferring rolling stock authorization to the European
Railway Agency as an important approach that would reduce the market entry cost and
time for new players by twenty percent and save the EU railway industry 500 million
euros by 2025 (Barrow, 2013).
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Part III: Theoretical Framework
Reasoning based on market competition principles can justify whether opening up rail
transport networks across Europe is a worthy process. As such, the following chapter will
present theoretical analyses of how eliminating monopoly power and boosting
competition make railway markets more efficient and socially desirable.
1. Monopoly
Suppose that a national railway network has a monopoly on a freight transport route and
that output equals the amount of goods carried in tons while price is the dollar amount
charged for each ton. When the incumbent monopoly firm wants to increase the number
of goods transported, it must reduce the price charged for its cargo service to appeal to
more customers, which leads to a price decrease in every ton it carries. As this would lead
to a decrease of total revenue in the existing amount of goods it was already receiving,
assuming that demand is inelastic, the monopoly would have no incentive to do so. As a
result, the marginal revenue of a monopoly is less than the price and the marginal revenue
curve lies below the demand curve (Figure 1). Just like any neoclassical firm, the
monopoly will choose the output level where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal
cost (MC), so the amount of goods the railway company carries is QM and the price it
charges is PM.
In contrast, if the freight transport market were perfectly competitive, the firm would still
choose an output level where MR equals MC, but the price it would charge, PC, results in
a larger total quantity of goods transported, QC, than under monopoly, QM. This socially
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efficient price-quantity combination is reached as the firm’s marginal revenue curve is
identical to the firm’s demand curve in a perfectly competitive market. Moreover, the
efficient equilibrium (QM, PM) incurs no deadweight loss, a market condition that is
considered efficient and socially desirable.

Price
MC

A

MC

Deadweight loss

PM

Producer surplus

PC

Consumer surplus
under monopoly

B

Demand
MR

QM

QC

Quantity

Figure 1: Market conditions under monopoly and competition
In a perfectly competitive market, consumer surplus is the area of triangle ABPC in
Figure 1. Under monopoly, the consumer surplus is shrunk to the gridded triangle area,
while the monopoly’s profit (or producer surplus) is represented by the dotted rectangle
above line BPC, which is the difference between monopolistic price and competitive
price, times the number of goods transported. The area of the vertically dashed triangle is
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called the deadweight loss, which indicates a social cost of economic inefficiency. As a
result of this, the government seeks to limit and regulate markets with monopoly power
to maximize efficiency and to reduce the social cost from deadweight loss.

2. Price competition
After the liberalization reforms, each rail transport market in Europe can be referred to as
an oligopoly, as there are now a small number of service providers. Popular oligopoly
analyses include the Cournot model – a quantity approach, and the Bertrand model – a
price approach (Judd, 1996). The Cournot model assumes that oligopolists set output and
the market price will adjust to match quantity. On the other hand, in the Betrand model,
oligopolists determine the price determinants and consumers choose output levels
contingent on the set market price. A 1999 study by Preston, Wheland and Wardman
highlighted that demand in transport markets, including rail transport, was inelastic, as
there is a set number of riders and a set number of goods carried in every route. When a
specific railway market has a new entrant, demand will not rise drastically and both the
incumbent and the newcomer have to determine their price strategy to meet the existing
demand. Given this nature of the railway industry, we can conclude that the Bertrand
model is more appropriate for the analysis of rail transport oligopolies.
Assume the following Bertrand game in a passenger rail route with 2 players: Firm A, the
incumbent and Firm B, the entrant. In order to find the best price strategy, newcomer
Firm B must consider both its own price and the existing monopoly Firm A’s price to
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determine the demand for its rail transport service. Furthermore, assume that services
offered by both firms are identical and that train riders’ choice is a function of price.
Initially, riders have no time preference of train services (time slot allocation will be
discussed further in the next section). If the newcomer Firm B sets its price higher than
that of the incumbent, no one will buy Firm B’s tickets. On the other hand, if Firm B sets
its price lower than Firm A’s price, no one will buy Firm A’s tickets. If Firm B selects a
price equal to the incumbent’s price, both firms will have an equal number of riders. The
discontinuous demand function for Firm B’s output can be expressed as follows:
qB = 0

if pB > pA

qB = (a – bp2)/2

if pB = pA

qB = a – bp2

if pB < pA

(From the Bertrand demand function: P = A – BQ, the demand function is rewritten as:
Q = a – bP where a = A/B and b = 1/B.)
From this function, we can determine Firm B’s profit, as a function of pA and pB:
πB (pA,pB) = 0

if pB > pA

πB (pA,pB) = (pB – c)(a – bpB)/2

if pB = pA

πB (pA,pB) = (pB – c)(a – bpB)

if pB < pA

where c is the cost of producing one unit, in this case, the cost of providing train service
for one ticket.
We now seek the price pB that maximizes Firm B’s profit in response to different choices
of pA. If Firm A sets its fare above the pure monopoly price, Firm B’s best response is to
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set its fare at the monopoly price and earn the monopoly profit. If Firm A sets a price
under its marginal cost c (which means Firm A will lose money by operating its train
service), Firm B’s best response is to set a higher price. In this case, Firm B has no riders
and sells no tickets. However, if Firm B sets its price lower than pA, and hence, lower
than its marginal cost c, it will gain negative profit. The most likely case, however, is
when the incumbent sets its price above the marginal cost but below or equal to the
monopoly price. If Firm B sets its fare equal to that of Firm A’s fare, both firms will
share an equal number of riders. However, if Firm B sets its fare slightly lower than Firm
A’s fare, it will cover the whole market while its profit margin per ticket is only lowered
by a very small amount.
We also expect a similar response from Firm A in response to any given choice of pB, as
this game is symmetric. Suppose that when Firm B enters the market, it sets its fare
slightly below Firm A’s fare. Then, Firm B will cover the entire market and Firm A will
have no riders. However, Firm A’s managers know that if it lowers its price slightly
below Firm B’s price, it will cover the entire market again and leave Firm B with no
riders. Simply put, in this game, both firms know that their best response is to set the
price slightly lower than the rival’s price. As a result, the only possible Nash equilibrium
is the equal price settings at the marginal cost (pA = c, pB = c). At this level, neither of the
firms wants to lower its fare further as negative profit will occur. Interestingly, the price
set equal at the marginal cost is also the same under perfect competition. This outcome
exemplifies the Bertrand Paradox, since there are only 2 firms with monopoly power
selling an identical product, but these firms are mimicking a perfectly competitive result.
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This certainly is an important result that highlights the ability of market opening reforms
to boost price competition and eliminate market power of incumbent railway monopolies.
The Bertrand analysis above is carried out under the assumption that both firms are equal
players in this oligopolistic passenger rail market and that riders have no preference of
one service over the other. However, in reality, the incumbent certainly has dominant
market power, given its established ridership and a more extensive network that makes it
easier for connections. As a result, the newcomer has to consider various methods to
avoid competing directly with the existing monopoly. The following section will discuss
in detail the decision making process that the entrant goes through.
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3.

Game theory models

Ruiz-Rúa and Palacín (2012) summarized the decision making process of a new railway
undertaking in the following diagram:

second stage
company strategic
assessment phase

company decides not
to enter into competition
NO
first stage
access decision phase

equilibrium prices
YES

market share

market calculation

investment requirement and needs

Figure 2: “Competition Strategic Plan” (Ruiz-Rúa & Palacín, 2012)
According to this strategy model, in the first stage, the newcomer decides whether or not
they should enter into competition, using available information pertaining existing
ridership, profit margins and regulations. In the next stage, the newcomer becomes a
market player and assesses operation strategies such as how much they should charge and
the market share they should cover. Price decisions are also crucial to the profitability of
service operations, as discussed in the Bertrand analysis. After evaluating their profits
based on the price and market share strategies, the new entrant will determine the
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investment requirements and come back to the first decision phase of whether they
should stay in the market.
Two of the most important market strategies that new railway undertakings have to
determine are time slot allocation and price determination. Scheduling strategies allow
the new player to avoid direct competition with the incumbent and cover the empty time
slots with higher growth potential. On the other hand, price setting decisions can
significantly affect the newcomer’s gain in ridership, which determines their ability to
stay in the market. The following analysis will provide a deeper insight into these two
game theoretical strategies.

a. Time slot allocation
Consider the following game based on Pepall and Richards and Norman’s hypothetical
example for air transport competition (2005). Suppose that a popular passenger train
route between two cities is currently run by Firm A, the national rail monopoly. After the
market opening reforms that allow fair access for all players to railway infrastructure
have been implemented, the newly-formed regional rail company Firm B is interested in
operating train services in the same route. Moreover, suppose that 60 percent of
customers prefer to take a morning train while only 40 percent prefer the evening
schedule. Also, assume that the incumbent is preferred over Firm B at a ratio of 3:1.
Reasons for this preference might include the incumbent’s customer loyalty program, a
larger network that makes it easier for connections, or riders’ status quo biases that
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prevent them from switching to the unfamiliar service run by Firm B. The strategy
combinations of time slot allocation and payoffs are as follows:

Firm B
Morning

Evening

Morning

45, 15

60, 40

Evening

40, 60

30, 10

Firm A

Table 1: Simultaneous game for time slot allocation
Firm A’s managers will seek their strategies in response to what they predict Firm B will
do, or Firm B’s reaction function. If Firm B chooses to operate in the morning, Firm A
will also choose a morning schedule, as the payoff is greater than an evening service. If
Firm B chooses to operate in the evening, Firm A will obviously choose the morning
schedule that riders prefer. The existing monopoly benefits from its established ridership
and will always choose to operate in the time slot with more customers (morning).
Therefore, Firm A’s dominant strategy is to choose the morning time slot, regardless of
what B does.
As for Firm B, competition would be difficult if they chose to operate at the same time
period as the incumbent. Therefore, Firm B will choose to operate in the evening if Firm
A runs the morning service. Likewise, if Firm A selects the evening schedule, Firm B
will try to avoid direct competition with Firm A by running a morning service. In other
words, when riders’ preference for one schedule over the other is not overwhelming (60%
for morning and 40% for evening), the new entrant Firm B is likely to select a different
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slot to avoid time conflict with the incumbent. This result is similar to the classical
“Chicken Game” in which each player’s best response is to choose the opposite strategy.
In short, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this hypothetical game is: Firm A runs a
rider-preferred morning schedule while Firm B operates their service in the evening, or
NEPS Firm A, Firm B = [Morning, Evening].

b. Price determination
As mentioned above, Preston, Whelan and Wardman’s 1999 study highlighted that the
rail transport demand in the United Kingdom was rather inelastic. When a new firm
entered the market and introduced a lower fare, the incumbent monopoly was forced to
reduce its existing fare as well. Moreover, this price reduction only brought about an
insignificant increase in ridership. Even though the trend might vary between countries,
the findings for the United Kingdom comply with the general tendency that transport
demand is inelastic. In other words, there is a set number of frequent riders in most routes
and a fare decrease does not expand ridership extensively.
Now, imagine the following price game. After the liberalization reforms, Firm B enters
the railway industry dominated by Firm A, which charges the monopoly profit
maximizing fare. The price strategy for Firm B can be explained by the following
extensive form game:

18

Firm B
same price

lower price

Firm A
s

same price

50, 50

Firm A

lower price

same price

0, 100

100, 0

lower price

50, 50

Figure 3: Sequential game for price determination
As the leader of this game for fare setting, newcomer Firm B has to determine how much
they should charge per ticket given Firm A’s existing monopolistic price. As it doesn’t
make sense if Firm B charges a higher fare while providing the same service, they will
choose between a price level equal or lower than that of Firm A. As the follower, Firm A
then considers whether they should keep their existing fare or reduce the price to match
Firm B’s new low price. When both railway firms have the same fare level, each of them
covers half of the market, assuming that riders have no preference for one firm over the
other. When the two firms charge different fares, the one with the lower price will cover
the whole market. It should also be noted that the inflexibility of rail transport demand, as
explained above, allows us to assume that the number of riders stays the same even after
a price reduction.
Applying backward induction to find a sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium specifies that
Firm A will choose to lower its price if Firm B charges the previous monopoly price so
that Firm A captures the entire market. On the other hand, if B sets a lower fare than A’s
previous fare, A will also reduce its price to match this lower ticket charge. Each firm
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now will cover half of the market. In the next step, knowing Firm A’s price strategy,
Firm B will decide to set its fare lower than previous monopolistic level so that it will
have half of the market share. The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this sequential
game is:
NESPFirm B, Firm A = [lower price, lower price]
In fact, the fares of the two firms are not automatically equal at first. However, both firms
continually reduce their prices until they reach an equal level at the marginal cost. As this
is exactly what happens in a perfectly competitive market, this result complies with the
Bertrand Paradox described in the previous section.
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Part IV: Econometric Tests
1. Literature review
Studies on European railway networks’ productivity after the liberalization process have
exhibited different approaches to evaluate network efficiency. The efficiency definition,
which mostly referred to either input-output efficiency or cost efficiency, led to
somewhat contradicting interpretations of rail liberalization results. Friebel, Ivaldi &
Vibes (2010) introduced a production frontier model, which directly measured the effect
of the (de)regulation on network output. This study utilized a simple input-output
regression model, which included a weighted sum of outputs in passenger transport and
freight as the dependent variable and capital and labor plus a dummy variable for the
policy implementation as explanatory variables. The findings justified the positive impact
of the sequential reforms in rail transport on the network output productivity. As the
model by Friebel et al. is very appropriate to my study, its properties will be discussed in
detail in the next section.
Instead of using an increase in output as an efficiency indicator, other studies on
European rail reforms have focused on operating costs to determine the impact of
deregulation on the networks’ performance (Asmild, Holvad, Hougaard & Kronborg,
2009; Driessen, Lijesen & Mulder, 2006; Growitsch & Wetzel, 2009). For instance,
Asmild et al. (2009) employed this approach using a Multi-directional Efficiency
Analysis with complete data from 23 European countries between 1995 and 2001, the
main phase of policy implementation for vertical separation between infrastructure
management and service operations. This Multi-directional Efficiency Analysis was
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aimed to identify how specific cost drivers changed as a result of these reforms. Results
also showed that the liberalization implementations generally helped increase the
operating cost efficiency of European railway networks. More specifically, vertical
disintegration significantly reduced both material and staff expenditures, while other
reform packages only resulted in improving efficiency in one of the two cost types.
Using a similar cost efficiency approach, Growitsch and Wetzel (2009) employed Data
Envelopment Analysis to focus on the effect of vertical separation on the cost efficiency
of railway companies. The analysis compared the vertically separated model of European
railway companies after liberalization with a hypothesized integrated model. The results,
which were based entirely on theoretical estimates rather than precise firm-level data,
disregarded the reforms’ aim to boost efficiency and favored vertical integration between
infrastructure management and service operations.
Driessen et al. (2006) also used Data Envelopment Analysis at an international level and
focused on measuring the relationship between competition design and rail transport
productive efficiency. Given the worldwide variability of production models, this study
highlighted that different methods of operating railway systems could result in different
network efficiency levels. Competitive public tendering, which was commonly practiced
in short distance routes in Europe, was found to significantly boost productive efficiency.
However, this analysis also pointed out that free market entry had a negative effect on the
networks’ cost efficiency.
The relationship between infrastructure management and service operations, briefly
mentioned in the production frontier model by Friebel et al., was fully analyzed by
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Cantos Sánchez (2001) using a translogarithmic cost function analysis. Covering twelve
European state-owned rail companies between 1973 and 1990, this mathematical study
suggested diseconomies of scope between freight and passenger transport: freight
transport costs were complementary to infrastructure costs while passenger transport
costs were substitutes for infrastructure management costs.

2. Econometric models
In this section, I develop two regression models to examine the impact of vertical
separation and market opening on network output. Test design is based on the production
frontier model by Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes (2010). This model captured the CobbDouglas production function which related output and two inputs, labor and capital.
Friebel et al. introduced technical progress (γi + θ0Deregulation) on the input side to
examine whether the implementation of railway reforms affected the productivity of
national railway networks. In the first regression, Friebel et al. did not distinguish
between the three types of reforms: vertical separation, third party access and formation
of an independent regulatory entity. Their study later analyzed the efficiency impact of
whether railway liberalization regulations were implemented as a package (two or three
reforms within a year) or in sequence, and found the latter method to be more effective.
My first study, however, focused solely on the vertical split between infrastructure
management and operations and its impact on network output. The econometric model,
thus, is specified as follows:

23

ln yit = β0 + β1 ln Kit+ β2 ln Lit + β3Separationit + εit
Capital (K) is measured by the track length of a particular country i in a specific year t.
Labor (L) is represented by the annual number of employees in a national railway
network. The dummy variable Separation takes the value of 0 in years prior to the
vertical split and 1 in years following the implementation. This leads to another main
difference between my test and the original production frontier model. Friebel et al.
(2010) used (γi+θ0Deregulation)t, a multiplicative variable between time and railway
liberalization to examine how the reforms shifted the slope of the productivity trend. My
study, however, employs a simpler dummy variable Separation, as the main focus of this
test is on how vertical disintegration has changed the level rather than the slope of the
productivity trend.
On the other hand, output (y) corresponds to a weighted sum of outputs in freight and
passenger traffic, as suggested in the output measures by Friebel et al.: ln yit =ln passkmit
+ λ ln tonkmit. Friebel et al. (2010) used an available estimate of ! based on an empirical
measure for the relationship between freight and passenger transport. This finding
suggested that ! lied between 0.24 and 0.27, which indicated that a one percent increase
in the amount of goods carried in freight transport approximately resulted in a 0.25
percent decrease in passenger traffic (Friebel et al., 2010).
The second linear regression also employs this production frontier model, but focuses on
how the level of competitiveness affects network output. The econometric model is
designed as follows:
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ln yit = β0 + β1 ln Kit+ β2 ln Lit + β3COMit + εit
The new explanatory variable COM represents IBM and Kirchner’s COM Index (2011),
which assessed the market opening level of national railway networks in Europe. The
COM Index captured three aspects of market opening reality: modal split between track
management and train service (20%), number of licensed and active railway companies
other than the incumbent (20%), and market share of these newcomer competitors (60%)
(IBM & Kirchner, 2011). Regarding the reality of vertical disintegration, the index
focused on operational share and improvement across time of modal split in both
passenger and rail transport. The second criterion on the number of newcomer railway
companies took into account three measures: certified new railway undertakings in
relation to network length, a ratio of active to certified railway undertakings and number
of railway undertakings with regular passenger transport service. Market share of external
railway undertakings, the most important category that contributed 60% to the total
index, consisted of share percentage as well as share increases across time. Overall, with
its comprehensive assessment of competitive dynamics, the COM Index is an appropriate
measure for the reality of railway market opening in Europe. A summary of how the 2011
index was conducted is illustrated in table A.1 of the Appendix.

3. Data collection
Information on the annual track length of all national railway networks was obtained
from the World Bank (2012) database. The International Union of Railways database
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(2011) provided my study with annual number of employees, number of passengers
transported per kilometer and the amount of goods carried per kilometer. Friebel et al.
(2010) also summarized information on years of vertical separation between
infrastructure management and service operations. Details are illustrated in Table A.2 of
the Appendix. My dataset comprises of twelve countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom over a twenty-three year period from 1985 to 2008, when all railway
reforms in the European Union took place.
The measure for competitiveness in my second regression model is the COM Index from
IBM and Kirchner’s 2011 study on EU rail liberalization. The data is collected from the
DICE Database of Center for Economic Studies, University of Munich (2011). As this
data source covered a more recent time frame, my study will include nine newer
members of the European Union: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. As the total number of countries has now
increased to twenty-one, the study on market opening reality is expected to provide a
broader perspective of railway competition in the European Union of the modern day. It
should also be noted that this index has only been published four times in 2002, 2004,
2007 and 2011. The data for other input and output variables will thus be collected for
only the year prior to each publication. In other words, compared to the first study on
vertical split, the dataset for this second econometric model captures a larger
geographical span of twenty-one railway markets but a smaller time frame of four years:
2001, 2003, 2006 and 2010. The latest COM Index of the countries in this study is
illustrated in Table A.2 of the Appendix. According to this 2011 chart, the United
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Kingdom was the most competitive national railway network while sparsely-populated
Finland and Lithuania ranked last. Another interesting fact of this index was the low
ranks of large rail networks such as Spain and France – third and fourth to last,
respectively. The detailed analysis of rail liberalization situations in different railway
networks will be coupled in my case studies chapter.

4. Regression results
a. Vertical disintegration
Table 1 summarizes the results of the first regression, which focuses on the vertical
split’s impact on productivity. The dependent variable is the weighted sum of outputs in
freight and passenger transport with λ chosen at 0.25, as explained in the previous
section. The parameter estimates for labor and capital are both positive. Furthermore, the
regression outcome indicates that a 25-percent increase in the number of employees
doubles the aggregate output, while an 81-percent increase in track length leads to the
same result. The positive sign of these parameter estimates is exactly in accordance with
the model design based on the Cobb-Douglass function as well as the result by Friebel et
al. (2010). However, the regression outcome in Friebel et al.’s study showed that
doubling the aggregate output would require a 53-percent increase in labor or a 74percent increase in capital, ceteris paribus. As my dataset covers more recent years’
information than that of Friebel et al. (2010), the vast difference in the parameter estimate
for labor might indicate technical advancement of rail transport, which leads to much
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improvement in productivity in terms of labor input. The sum of β1 and β2 is slightly
bigger than 1, which suggests small increasing economies of scale: increasing all inputs
by the same percentage will lead to a proportionally larger increase in output.

Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

304.897734
67.8211753

3
284

101.632578
.238806955

Total

372.718909

287

1.29867216

output

Coef.

lncapital
lnlabour
separation
_cons

.2501608
.80738
.5636402
3.575818

Std. Err.
.0596072
.052531
.0656746
.3174415

t
4.20
15.37
8.58
11.26

Number of obs
F( 3,
284)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=
=

288
425.58
0.0000
0.8180
0.8161
.48868

P>|t|

[95% Conf. Interval]

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

.1328329
.7039805
.4343694
2.950981

.3674888
.9107796
.6929109
4.200655

Table 1: Regression results: vertical split model
More importantly, my regression results highlight a positive relationship between the
policy implementation variable and aggregate output. On average, the vertical separation
between infrastructure management and train service helps increase the network’s output
by 0.56 percent. All t-values for the three parameter estimates are also statistically
significant at a one-percent confidence level. Furthermore, the t-value of the parameter
estimate for vertical split in this study is far more significant than that of Friebel et al.’s
test, which failed to meet the 5% confidence level that rejected the null hypothesis that
railway deregulation did not improve productivity. Small standard errors in the results
also indicate the sample’s representativeness of the population, which can be explained
by the large sample size and the comprehensiveness of data from the International Union
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of Railways (UIC) and the World Bank. Thus, my regression results suggest that vertical
separation between infrastructure management and train service has brought about greater
network productivity in years following its implementation.
Friebel et al. (2010) also underlined the data unavailability for the United Kingdom as an
important factor that might affect their regression interpretation. In my study, the UK
data from the International Union of Railways is partially inconsistent, especially in labor
input, as many of the new rail franchises did not report their data annually. Missing
values are estimated using data from the previous submission. Because of this
shortcoming, I ran an alternative regression without the United Kingdom as suggested by
Friebel et al. (2010). The regression results are as follows:

. regress output lncapital lnlabor separation
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

268.300145
61.9771018

3
260

89.4333817
.238373468

Total

330.277247

263

1.25580702

output

Coef.

lncapital
lnlabor
separation
_cons

.2313242
.7930444
.5376439
3.883821

Std. Err.
.0597267
.0535237
.0676925
.3256507

t
3.87
14.82
7.94
11.93

Number of obs
F( 3,
260)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=
=

264
375.18
0.0000
0.8123
0.8102
.48824

P>|t|

[95% Conf. Interval]

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

.1137145
.6876494
.4043487
3.242573

.3489338
.8984395
.6709392
4.52507

Table 2: Regression results: vertical split model (without United Kingdom data)
Removing the United Kingdom data does not cause much change in the regression
results. The new fitted model dictates that, under ceteris-paribus conditions, a 79-percent
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increase in the number of employees would lead to a doubling of output while a 23percent increase in track length would bring about the same result. Besides, excluding
data from the United Kingdom (or reducing the sample size) makes the effects less
significant, indicated by smaller t-values for all parameter estimates of the new model.
Interestingly, in Friebel et al.’s 2010 test, the model that omitted the United Kingdom
data actually resulted in a higher t-value for the parameter estimate of the deregulation
variable. The opposite trend observed in this study might come from the fact that the
UIC’s data for the United Kingdom are now available for all years covered in the analysis
despite their inconsistency, while the dataset by Friebel et al. had to exclude the period
when data were unobtainable. The difference in my study’s time frame might also lead to
different regression outcomes. In addition, the sum of β1 and β2 in this model is reduced
much closer to 1, which nearly suggests constant returns to scale: if all inputs are
increased by the same percentage, output will increase by a proportionally equivalent
amount.

b. Competitiveness
In my second econometric model, the dummy variable for vertical disintegration in the
first regression is replaced by a variable for IBM and Kirchner’s COM Index, a measure
of competitive dynamics levels across Europe. With a larger geographical coverage and
different time span, this model is expected to provide an alternative view of rail transport
productivity after market opening. Table 3 below illustrates the regression results.

30

. regress output lncapital lnlabor com
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

141.071756
48.896592

3
70

47.0239188
.698522743

Total

189.968348

73

2.60230614

output

Coef.

lncapital
lnlabor
com
_cons

.2761368
.9372098
.0020791
1.252618

Number of obs
F( 3,
70)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

.1826284
.1695211
.0005115
.9194929

1.51
5.53
4.06
1.36

0.135
0.000
0.000
0.177

=
=
=
=
=
=

74
67.32
0.0000
0.7426
0.7316
.83578

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.088104
.5991106
.0010589
-.5812524

.6403776
1.275309
.0030993
3.086489

Table 3: Regression results: competitiveness model
The fitted model denotes that with other inputs remaining constant, a one-point increase
in the level of railway market competitiveness leads to a 0.2-percent increase in aggregate
output. The t-value for the COM variable’s parameter estimate is also significant at a
one-percent confidence level. We thus can conclude that an increase in market
competitiveness can help improve overall productivity. Both coefficients for capital and
labor input have positive signs, which is in accordance with the results from the first
study. However, capital is surprisingly not statistically significant at a five-percent
confidence level in predicting overall output. The most likely reason for this is
differences in rail technology across the present-day European Union where the
relationship between track building and overall output can vary greatly between different
rail networks. The limited time span of the COM Index also poses another shortcoming
of this model, which might result in the insignificance of the capital variable.
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Part V: Country Comparison
1. Overview
IBM Global Services, in conjunction with Christian Kirchner (2011), introduced the Rail
Liberalization Index (LIB Index) to measure the relative degree of market opening of rail
transport markets in the European Union, Switzerland and Norway. This index was a
combination of two indices for market competition in theory and practice: the LEX Index
and the ACCESS Index. Kirchner (2004) described the LEX Index as a measurement of
the “law in books,” as it captured the degree of market entry support and external railway
undertakings in the national competition regulation. On the other hand, the ACCESS
Index indicated a “law in action” measurement that evaluated the reality of market
accessibility and barriers to entry from potential external competitors’ point of view
(IBM & Kirchner, 2011). The combined LIB Index put more weight on the reality of
railway markets after liberalization, with the ACCESS Index accounting for 80 percent of
the total measurement. This 2011 study placed Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany,
the Netherlands, Denmark and Austria at the top tier in its chart as markets with
accessibility at the “Advanced” level. The majority of EU member states were in the
second tier as networks with “On Schedule” market opening, while Lithuania, Greece,
Latvia, Luxembourg, Spain and Ireland fell behind at the lowest “Delayed” level.
This same report also classified national railway networks in the EU into three categories
based on the forms of vertical separation between the infrastructure manager and the
service operator: separation, integration and hybrid. A separation model featured
completely separate ownership of infrastructure management and network services, as
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found in the national railway networks of Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Greece, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia and the United Kingdom.
On the other hand, an integration model was characterized by a legal and functional
separation of infrastructure and service levels but these two branches still existed under
an umbrella corporation. As of 2011, this was the model of the railway networks in
fourteen countries: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Estonia,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. Lastly, the
hybrid model in France and the Czech Republic specified an independent infrastructure
manager delegating its tasks back to the incumbent train service operator as part of an
agency agreement. To address the concern of whether the network’s operation model
affects its accessibility, IBM and Kirchner’s 2011 study also showed no correlation
between the model types and the degree of market opening.

2. The United Kingdom and the franchising system
Ranking first in 2007 and second in 2011 (behind Sweden) in IBM and Kirchner’s Rail
Liberalization Index report (2011), the United Kingdom has one of the most liberalized
rail transport markets in the European Union. The British railway network is a foremost
example of the separation model that involves a complete vertical split between
infrastructure managers and service operators. The Railways Act 1993, the first
regulatory implementation of railway liberalization, imposed structural reforms focusing
on the transfer of railway companies’ ownership to the private sector, as well as a
fundamental separation between infrastructure management and train operations.
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Following the Act, a new government-owned infrastructure manager, Railtrack, was
formed in 1994 as a completely separated entity from British Rail, the dominant
incumbent at the time (Kain, 1998). In May 1996, the liberalization process took a further
step as Railtrack became publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange. On the other
hand, the remainder of British Rail was completely split into privatized companies with
different concentrations in operations, including (Kain, 1998):
•

Seven in infrastructure maintenance

•

Seven in infrastructure services design

•

Six in track renewal

•

Three in rolling stock leasing (ROSCOs)

•

Six in freight transport operations

•

Twenty-five in franchised passenger transport operations

With a very large number of newly formed entities from the previous dominant British
Rail, the railway liberalization process in the United Kingdom achieved not only a
complete vertical separation but also a thorough horizontal split.
A notable characteristic of the British rail transport liberalization is its franchising
system. The fundamental railroad reform in 1993 helped establish twenty-five privately
owned passenger train operations units that went under a franchising process
administered by the Director of Rail Franchising, which was also formed following the
Railways Act. Currently, the process is carried out by the Department of Transport,
which invites potential bidders to tender for a specific route as the previous franchising
contract is expiring. The governing authority then takes into account numerous criteria
such as service frequency, infrastructure payment and the level of public subsidy the
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bidder needs. The standard length of a rail franchise is seven years; however, franchise
holders that make additional investments in special routes have the option for longer
contracts. It should also be noted that rolling stocks, such as locomotives, train cars and
wagons, are not owned by franchised service operators. The liberalization process has
established a separate group of companies, the ROSCOs, which provide the franchise
holders with the rolling stocks through independent leasing contracts. Overall, the British
regulators’ attempt to liberalize the rail transport market could be seen as very thorough
and systematic: the reforms help boost newcomers’ fair access to all of the network’s
primary resources including rail tracks, rolling stocks and government subsidies. A
detailed map of the relationships between the newly formed entities after their split from
British Rail was highlighted in Kain’s 1998 report:

Figure 4: Relationships between rail transport entities in the UK (Kain, 1998)
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The British franchising system has been proved successful with significant increases in
passenger volume and service frequency of 70.1% and 36.7% respectively (European
Commission, 2010). Politt and Smith (2001) also pointed out that privatization helped
lower both prices and public subsidies. However, since the Railways Act’s
implementation in 1994, its complexity and unclear accountabilities have been widely
criticized (BBC, 2006). First of all, the governing authority of the franchising process
seemed to place a strong emphasis on the financial aspect of the bids. For a franchise that
required a public subsidy, lowest-bid winners had to comply with stricter standard
requirements, which were generally close to the levels of the British Rail service before
privatization. On the other hand, operators of profitable routes, who paid infrastructure
fees instead of receiving government subsidies, were likely to gain more freedom in their
operations (Preston, Whelan, Nash & Wardman, 2000). This has led to critical questions
on the franchises’ safety standards. Furthermore, severe railway accidents following
British Rail’s vertical and horizontal split also casted a doubt on the maintenance and
renewal process of Railtrack, the private-sector infrastructure manager, and the shortterm investment tendency of franchise holders was also blamed for devaluing the system
maintenance and durability (European Commission, 2010). As a response to this, in 2001
the Strategic Rail Authority was formed to improve the administration of the franchising
process while stricter maintenance requirements were introduced to raise the network’s
standards. Moreover, the highly-criticized for-profit infrastructure manager Railtrack was
succeeded in 2002 by Network Rail, which has operated as a non-profit entity.
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3. Germany: open access and public service obligations

IBM and Kirchner’s 2011 European Rail Liberalization Index report ranked Germany as
the third most advanced railway market in the rail transport liberalization process, behind
Sweden and the United Kingdom. With the infrastructure manager and service operator
functioning independently under an umbrella corporation, the national railway network in
Germany is a notable example of the integrated model in IBM and Kirchner’s 2011
study. Before the rail liberalization policy took place, Deutsche Bahn AG was the sole
provider of both national and regional services in Germany (European Commission,
2010). Following the implementation of the EU Council Directive 91/440, the passenger
traffic division DB Bahn, the logistics unit DB Schenker and the infrastructure
management subsidiary DB Netze were established in 2007 as separate organizational
entities at the accounting level. The detailed functional relationships between different
railway entities in Germany are demonstrated in Figure 5 (Link, 1994).
The further privatization process of the state-owned Deutsche Bahn has been under
heated debate: the Merkel government approved a plan in 2007 that aimed at splitting
Deutsche Bahn gradually while granting it the control over the track network for the
following 15 years. This plan was met with uneasy response from the sixteen states’
transportation ministers, as they feared Deutsche Bahn’s overpowering track management
could hamper competition, which would lead to lower service frequency in remote areas
(Lindsey, 2007). A 2007 report by Slack and Volt also signified Deutsche Bahn’s
dominance in both infrastructure and the traffic services in the future despite legislative
measures (Slack & Volt, 2007).
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Figure 5: Relationships between railway entities in Germany (Link, 1994)
The German railroad liberalization process could also be characterized by the concurrent
existence of two operational options: open access and public service contract. The
European Commission’s 2010 report recognized the common practice of public service
obligations (PSOs) in the regional passenger market where external competitors had
emerged by 2010 and DB Regio’s dominance had been consistently reduced. In 2006,
external operators achieved a 15.2 percent share of the regional passenger rail network,
which translated to a 10.1 percent share of the overall system (Beria, Quinet, de Ruz &
Schulz, 2010). Passenger transport in short distance is not profitable for the most part and
thus requires public subsidies. The competitive tendering process in Germany is carried
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out similarly to the United Kingdom’s franchising with the bidder for the lowest public
subsidies winning the contract. The European Commission’s 2010 study highlighted the
success of Germany’s PSOs as the regional passenger transport market achieved
significant gains in ridership, service frequency and network extension. However, this
report also underlined larger costs for local governments in providing public subsidies as
competitive tendering became widely practiced in all regional networks, including very
remote ones. Overall, public service obligations could be seen as socially beneficial but
also financially burdensome.
On the other hand, Germany’s interregional passenger network is characterized by the
open access practice. The market is open to any competitor interested in operating forprofit in long distance routes. However, the European Commission pointed out the
regulatory uncertainty and the very powerful position of the incumbent, Deutsche Bahn
as reasons for the lack of market entry (2010). In 2006, external operators contributed to
less than one percent of the market share in long distance passenger traffic (Beria et al.,
2010). However, Germany’s railway liberalization process could still be considered
partially successful as the vertical disintegration at the accounting level led to a surplus in
Deutsche Bahn’s budget, which had never occurred before this policy implementation.
The introduction of the United Kingdom’s competitive franchising, which was already
employed in Germany’s bus industry, was also unlikely: franchising would require a
complete separation between infrastructure management and service operations as well as
a breakup of the incumbent monopoly (Lalive & Schmutzler, 2008).
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4. France and the hybrid model
The railway network in France exemplifies IBM and Kirchner’s hybrid model of
liberalization (2011): the independent Reseau Ferré de France (RFF) controls the
infrastructure management level, but still transfers major track management tasks to the
national rail transport provider SNCF through special contracts. This indicates an unclear
vertical separation between infrastructure management and service operations.
Furthermore, the French government owns both RFF and SNCF and acts as the decisive
supervisor of SNCF to stabilize its financial flow and plan research and development
projects. On the other hand, national infrastructure manager RFF, though owned by the
government, operates independently (Szekely, 2009).
In IBM’s 2011 Rail Liberalization Index report, France moved up from the “delayed”
level in 2007 to the “on schedule” group in 2011. This highlighted the progress of railway
liberalization in France, even though its market was still far less open than those of the
United Kingdom and Germany. Following EU Directive 91/440, the RFF was split from
SNCF in 1997 to become an independent infrastructure manager. However, after thirteen
years of the supposed liberalization process, SNCF was still the sole provider of rail
transport and operated under public service obligations both regionally and nationally. By
2006, a few service providers had licensed their operations but still remained inactive
thereafter (Beria et al. 2010). Sakamoto (2012) underlined that the RFF formation was
simply to obey EU regulations, while RFF and SNCF were almost integrated in reality: in
2004, RFF paid SNCF 2.6 billion euros for its infrastructure maintenance in exchange for
2.3 billion euros in infrastructure access fee from SNCF.
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Moreover, Quinet (2006) labeled France as “one of the most reluctant countries to
provide open access” and pointed out that the operation of the French railway network
following liberalization had been rather unsuccessful and was under increasing pressure
for productivity improvement. In this report, SNCF’s debt rose seventeen percent from 35
billion euros in 1991 to 41 billion in 2005, even though it had transferred more than half
of its debt (20.5 million euro) to RFF through the modal split in 1996. Quinet (2006) also
noted SNCF’s loss in eighty percent of its cargo services in 2004.
Regarding the low level of market opening in France’s rail transport, researchers have
raised multiple questions about public opinions on railway liberalization. Tomeš’s 2008
study underlined the French government’s reluctance to liberalize the market as French
politicians were skeptical about the benefits from greater competition and also questioned
market opening’s suitability to the incumbent network. Moreover, Rogers (2007)
highlighted France’s prevalent preference of minimizing competition to endorse social
equality and cohesion as another barrier hindering the liberalization of rail transport,
which was widely regarded as a non-profit public service. Therefore, with the skepticism
of both the government and the general public about promoting competition, it is unlikely
that significant progress in the liberalization of the French railway network will arise in
the near future.
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Part VI: Concluding Remarks
Rail transport liberalization has taken place in the European Union in the last twenty
years. The core of the reforms was a vertical disintegration between track management
and train service operations, which was initiated in Directive 91/440. Thereafter, the
legislative mechanisms were further developed to enhance market entry, interoperability,
competitiveness and service quality. In 1995, the European Commission adopted two key
regulations to enable universal licensing procedures for train operators and guarantee
non-discriminatory infrastructure allocation and capacity charging for new railway
undertakings. The 2001 First Railway Package defined clearer relationships between
infrastructure management and service operations and enhanced fair access by requiring
an independent entity to set and collect infrastructure usage fees. The 2004 Second
Railway Package focused on upgrading interoperability for international train services
and established the European Railway Agency to harmonize safety principles between
national networks. Interoperability was further enhanced in the 2007 Third Railway
Package, which allowed free access to international passenger transport market, ensured
passengers’ rights across Europe and enabled common licensing for train drivers.
My theoretical framework analyzed how opening up monopolistic rail transport markets
can eliminate the deadweight loss to society. Using a Bertrand analysis, my study
furthermore specifies a fare reduction to the perfectly competitive level in rail transport
markets after liberalization. Two game theoretical models also highlight how opening up
rail transport markets leads to diversifying service schedules and lowering prices.
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My econometric tests employ the production frontier model by Friebel et al. (2010). The
regression results justify the effects of vertical split and market opening on network
productivity, both of which are significant at a one-percent confidence level. Therefore,
rail transport liberalization is a worthy process that European rail networks can benefit
from in multiple aspects. Indeed, railway liberalization should be developed and carried
out more thoroughly across the European Union, especially as the trans-European rail
network becomes more integrated.
In practice, the modal split between infrastructure management and service operations
exists in three main methods: complete separation (United Kingdom), functional and
legal separation an umbrella company (Germany) and a hybrid model that involves
special agreements between track management and operations (France). The result of
market opening also varies widely between member states. The United Kingdom utilizes
a franchising process and has liberalized its network to a great extent. In the United
Kingdom and Sweden, the two most deregulated rail networks, passenger volume has
increased, while fares and public subsidies have dropped since liberalization (European
Commission, 2010; Pollitt & Smith, 2001; Alexandersson & Hultén, 2008). Germany has
also achieved an advanced level in railway reforms, even though the incumbent’s
dominance has nevertheless remained prevalent. Meanwhile, given the government’s
stubborn ownership of the railway network and a social reluctance to open up the market,
France still has a long way to go in its rail liberalization process.
A major concern arises over my study’s sole focus on production output as a determinant
of liberalization success. Are customers of the extensively privatized British rail network
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more satisfied than those of the vertically integrated French network? Rising questions on
the British network’s safety standards reflect public discontent with rail liberalization to
some extent. Meanwhile, both France’s government and general public consider rail
transport as a non-profit public service and are not willing to implement liberalization
reforms. However, a 2011 report by the European Commission pointed out that British
train riders were significantly more satisfied with their country’s network than French
ones in multiple aspects. Eighty-four percent of passengers in the United Kingdom were
“very or rather satisfied” with the frequency of trains, while 73 percent of passengers in
France had the same response. Moreover, 87 percent of British train riders were pleased
by the network’s punctuality and reliability, while only 55 percent of French customers
felt the same. The United Kingdom also ranked higher than France in traveling speed,
information provision and connections. Notably, the UK ranked relatively low in rail
cars’ cleanliness and maintenance, which reflected the public concern mentioned in the
case studies section. Thus, in short, this European Commission study (2011) suggested
that passengers of the more liberalized British rail network were generally more satisfied
with its services than those in France. However, given no data availability of customer
satisfaction over the period prior and after liberalization, more studies need to be
developed to capture the relationship between market opening and public opinion.
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Appendix
Criteria
Modal split changes
Change in the modal split for rail freight transport (2001 2008)
Change in the modal split for rail passenger transport (2001 2008)
Share of modal split for rail freight transport 2008
Share of modal split for rail passenger transport 2008
Number of external RUs 2009
Certified RUs (excl. incumbent) in relation to network length
Ratio of active RUs to certified RUs
Number of active RUs providing passenger services on a
regular basis
Market share external RUs 2009
Market share ext. RUs in terms of transport performance
Increase in market share of ext. RUs between 2006 and 2009

% in overall
index
20

% in
category
40
40
10
10

20
40
50
10
60

Table A.1. The makeup of the 2011 COM Index (IBM & Kirchner, 2011)

Country
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
The Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

Year of vertical split
1997
1998
1997
1995
1997
1994
1998
1995
1997
1996
1988
1993

Table A.2. Time of vertical separation (Friebel et al., 2010)

45

75
25

Country
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Denmark
Estonia
Germany
Sweden
Austria
Hungary
Poland
Italy
Portugal
Belgium
Czech Republic
Bulgaria
Latvia
Slovakia
Slovenia
France
Spain
Finland
Lithuania

2011 COM Index
866
680
655
629
615
577
575
522
518
470
434
424
422
421
411
381
337
334
333
156
120

Table A.3. IBM’s 2011 COM Index (Kirchner, 2011)
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